英文互译镜像站

Kosovo Operation (1944)

Last updated
Kosovo Operation
Part of World War II in Yugoslavia
Poduevo 1944.jpg
Bulgarian armored brigade in November 1944 in Podujevo
Date15 October – 22 November 1944
Location
Kosovo, Albanian Kingdom
Result Allied victory
Belligerents
Flag of the Bulgarian Homeland Front.svg Bulgaria
Flag of Yugoslavia (1943-1946).svg Yugoslav Partisans
Flag of the Democratic Government of Albania (1944-1946).svg Albanian Partisans

Flag of Germany (1935-1945).svg  Germany

Commanders and leaders
Units involved
Map of the October-November 1944 Bulgarian offensive in Yugoslavia. Its main task was to cover up the Soviet advance to Belgrade. Bulgarian offensives in Yugoslavia 1944.png
Map of the October–November 1944 Bulgarian offensive in Yugoslavia. Its main task was to cover up the Soviet advance to Belgrade.

The Kosovo Operation was a major strategic military offensive launched between 15 October and 22 November 1944 by the Bulgarian 2nd Army, with the assistance of the Yugoslav Partisans and Albanian Partisans, against German forces and local collaborationist auxiliaries in Kosovo. Although the Bulgarian army was the main force which drove the Germans out of the area, later Yugoslav historiography has downplayed its role for political reasons. [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] Accounts of these events in post-war Yugoslav literature give the impression that the Germans were driven out by the communist Partisans who liberated the area. There was some fighting by the Yugoslav Partisans, but their actions were insignificant compared with Bulgarian military activity. [6] [7]

Contents

Background

German and Collaborator Defenses

Despite the inevitable defeat, German Army Group E, retreating from Greece and North Macedonia, considered the Kosovo communication line (specifically the Kosovska Mitrovica – Skopje route) vital for the withdrawal of its troops toward Bosnia. To secure this corridor, the Germans mobilized approximately 30,000 Albanian collaborators (Balli Kombëtar), who were deployed to hold positions against the advancing 24th and 46th Serbian Divisions of the NOVJ and the Bulgarian forces. The German command also relied on the "Langer" and "Bredov" combat groups to protect the flanks of the retreating columns. [8]

Yugoslav-Bulgarian Coordination

A crucial element of the operation was the new strategic alliance between the NOVJ and the Bulgarian Army. Following the political changes in Bulgaria and the formation of the Fatherland Front government, Bulgaria sought to contribute to the war against Germany to redeem its national standing. [8]

In a meeting in Craiova between Marshal Josip Broz Tito and Bulgarian representatives, an agreement was reached for joint operations. The new Bulgarian Second Army was welcomed as a fraternal fighting force. [8] Acting under the operational command of the 3rd Ukrainian Front of the Red Army and in close coordination with the Supreme Headquarters of the NOVJ, the Bulgarian forces were tasked to push into Kosovo with the Yugoslavs. This cooperation symbolized the new anti-fascist unity in the Balkans, with Yugoslav and Bulgarian units fighting shoulder-to-shoulder to cut off the German retreat. [8]

Operation

The main forces involved in this undertaking were Bulgarian 2nd Army supported by the Yugoslav 24th and 46th Divisions as well as the 1st through 5th "Kosovo-Metohija" Brigades and the Albanian 3rd and 5th Brigades of the People's Liberation Army of Albania. [9] These forces were assisted by air sorties of the Western Allies and the Soviets against units of Generaloberst Alexander Löhr's Army Group "E" as the latter retreated from Greece. [10] The Axis order of battle against the Bulgarians and Yugoslavs in this operation comprised some 17,000 men including the Kampfgruppe "Langer" with three infantry companies, one artillery battery and one platoon of tanks, Kampfgruppe "Bredow" with six infantry battalions, three artillery battalions and 10 tanks), Kampfgruppe "Skanderbeg" with about 7,000 men of Waffen-SS August Schmidhuber's 21st Mountain Division "Skanderbeg" and about 4,000 German navy personnel making their way to the north from Greece. [9]

The Germans were supported by some 10,000 men of the Balli Kombëtar (National Front), the Albanian nationalist, anti-communist and anti-monarchist organisation. The Albanian nationalist forces and the 21st Waffen Mountain Division SS "Skanderbeg" served as the rearguard for the Wehrmacht's retreat, helping the Germans successfully withdraw large forces from Greece and Albania. [11] The SS Skanderbeg was extensively utilised by the Germans, advancing into the mountains and engaging Partisan troops on a daily basis, to cover the flanks of the Wehrmacht. [12] As the offensive against the Germans drove into full swing the SS "Skanderbeg" was issued with orders to increase repression of the Partisan forces and any sympathisers. In keeping with these orders, 131 NLM (Albanian Partisan) prisoners were shot or hanged in Kosovo by members of the division by 23 October. [13]

Aftermath

Freeing the Kosovo region from the Germans did not bring immediate peace and order. [14] After the Germans had been driven out, Tito ordered the collection of weapons in Kosovo and the arrest of prominent Albanians. The order was not well received and, combined with passions felt about Kosovo, inflamed an insurrection. [15] On 2 December 1944, anti-communist Albanians from the Drenica region attacked the Trepca mining complex and other targets. Numbering at most 2,000 men, these anti-communists managed to hold off a Partisan force of 30,000 troops for two months. [15] Now "an armed uprising of massive proportions" broke out in Kosovo led by the Balli Kombëtar (which still had around 9,000 men under arms at the time), which aimed to resist incorporation of Kosovo into communist Yugoslavia. [15] It was only in July 1945 that the Yugoslav Partisans were able to put down the uprising and establish their control over Kosovo. [15]

See also

Citations

  1. ↑ "Until the Soviet-Yugoslav rift in 1948, a trilateral military-political alliance between the U.S.S.R, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria dominated the strategic situation in the Balkans. As a direct consequence of the Moscow talks, Tito met with a delegation from the Bulgarian government's Fatherland Front on October 5, 1944, in Krajova, and on the same day, concluded an agreement on the participation of the new battles on Yugoslav territory. The three armies took part in the Belgrade Operation, which was launched in late September 1944, and Yugoslav-Bulgarian relations flourished with the patronage of the Soviet Union. Southeastern Europe's fate was effectively secured." For more, see Norman Naimark, The Establishment Of Communist Regimes In Eastern Europe, 1944-1949, Routledge, 2018, ISBN   0429976216, p. 60.
  2. ↑ "By the end of November, almost all of Macedonia and Serbia had been liberated and cleansed of German units. The Bulgarian army is largely responsible for achieving this goal. A military contingent of more than 450,000 troops participated in the campaign. Even though the Bulgarian offensive was undertaken with the cooperation of the Yugoslav Liberation Army, as all observers at the time noted, the latter's forces were absolutely insufficient and without Bulgarian participation, defeating the enemy would have been impossible. Another thing noted at the time was the wholly upright behavior of Bulgarian troops in Macedonia and Serbia. After conquering a given territory, the army turned over control to the new administration that was being formed from the ranks of the Yugoslav opposition. In contradiction to preliminary expectations, it was found that the whole local population, especially in urban areas, calmly accepted the Bulgarian military presence in the region. This generally positive attitude was connected to the idea of a future federation between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria that was beginning to be promoted." For more, see Ivaylo Znepolski et al., Bulgaria under Communism, Routledge Histories of Central and Eastern Europe, Routledge, 2018, ISBN   1351244892.
  3. ↑ "Military realities, however, made this incident look very ironic indeed, for Skopje was liberated by Bulgarian forces, while the Macedonian Partisans remained in the surrounding hills, and came down only to celebrate their entrance to the city. Similar scenes occurred in many other towns of Macedonia and Serbia, pointing to the fact that, from a military perspective the Russians were right: the Bulgarian army was the only force capable of driving the Germans quickly from Yugoslavia. Needless to say, the official Macedonian historiography, written mainly by Apostolski himself, understandably played down the crucial role of the Bulgarians. The glorification of the Partisan movement, an essential component of the post-war Yugoslav political culture-and more personal Partisan considerations left little room for such 'technicalities' ... For information on the military situation in Macedonia and Serbia and the role of the Bulgarian army see FO 371/43608, R17271, 24/11/1944; FO 371/44279, R16642,14/10/1944; FO 371/43630, R19495, 24/11/1944; WO 208, 113B, 12/9/1944. The sources, which contain intelligence reports from BLOs, confirm the decisive role of the Bulgarian army in the liberation of Skopje, Nis, Prilep, and the Morava Valley." For more, see Dimitris Livanios, The Macedonian Question: Britain and the Southern Balkans 1939–1949, Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2008; ISBN   9780199237685, p. 134.
  4. ↑ "For a detailed description of the German withdrawal from Greece through Macedonia and the central Balkans to Bosnia ... see the account by one of the participants, Erich Schmidt-Richberg, 'Der Endkampf auf dem Balkan'. General Schmidt-Richberg was chief of staff of Army Group E, deployed in Greece ... The Yugoslavs' main criticism of the book was that it did not mention the Partisan units that fought the Germans as soon as they entered Yugoslav territory in Macedonia. Schmidt-Richberg only mentioned Bulgarian divisions, which had changed camps and were now fighting the Germans. But the Yugoslavs claimed that the main burden of fighting the Germans was theirs and that the Bulgarians did not have their heart in fighting their erstwhile allies. The claim applies to Partisan operations in the area between the Greek frontier on the south and the Drina River on the northwest – Macedonia, Southern Serbia, Kosovo and Sndjak. It is interesting to note that in a series of maps from Army Group E on its withdrawal through Macedonia and Serbia toward the Drina River and Bosnia, there is almost no indications on Yugoslav Partisan units… The contribution of Bulgarian troops in fighting the Germans in the fall of 1944 in Macedonia and Serbia is still much debated between Yugoslav and Bulgarian military historians." For more, see Jozo TomasevichWar and Revolution in Yugoslavia, 1941-1945: Occupation and Collaboration. Volume 2, Stanford University Press, 2002, ISBN   0804779244, pp. 751-752.
  5. ↑ "Soviet arrogance was evident at all levels of the Red Army, beginning with its commander in chief. Stalin told Tito at a meeting that the Bulgarian army (which switched sides in the war in September 1944) was superior to Partisans, praising the professionalism of its officers. This was a pure provocation from the Soviet leader. The Bulgarians were Partisan wartime foes, and regardless of whether it was true, Stalin meant to put the assertive Yugoslav leadership in its place by insulting Tito's proudest achievement: his army. Furthermore, the Red Army's operational maps often excluded Partisan units, indicating the command's failure to even acknowledge that Yugoslavs played any role in the defeat of the Germans in the country. Further below in the chain of command, Partisan commanders had to appeal to the Red Army's political departments to include in their public statements the fact that Belgrade was liberated jointly by the Red Army and Partisans and not just by the Soviets, as well as to cease treating the Partisans as unknowledgeable and as a second-rate army." For more, see Majstorović, Vojin. "The Red Army in Yugoslavia, 1944–1945". p. 414 in Slavic Review, vol. 75, no. 2, 2016, pp. 396–421. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/10.5612/slavicreview.75.2.396. Accessed October 24, 2020.
  6. ↑ Jože Pirjevec (2024) The Partisans and Politics, Taylor & Francis, ISBN   9781040266014, p. 168.
  7. ↑ "By 23 October the Bulgarians had reached the vicinity of Podujevo, in the north-eastern corner of Kosovo; another Bulgarian force was also closing on Kumanovo, a strategically important town just to the north-east of Skopje. For a crucial period of a fortnight, however, this front remained more or less static. This was thanks to two factors: the disruption of the Bulgarian army by the sudden removal (at Russian insistence) of its old officer corps, and the dogged resistance of the Scholz Group, which was assisted by up to 5,000 Albanians in the Prishtina-Mitrovica area (of whom some belonged to the security force recruited in Albania by Xhafer Deva, and 700 were members of the Skanderbeg division) as well as some local Chetnik formations. The Germans formed a plan for the orderly evacuation of their forces, which they were able to carry out on schedule, abandoning Skopje on 11 November, destroying installations at the Trepcha mine on the 12th and leaving Prishtina on the 19th, from where they retreated north-westwards into Bosnia. Accounts of these events published in post-war Yugoslavia give the impression that the Germans were driven out by the Partisans, who 'liberated' the cities of Kosovo by force. There was some fighting by a combined force of Yugoslav and Albanian Partisans in Western Kosovo, mainly against the remnants of the Skanderbeg division; but these actions were quite insignificant compared with the Soviet-Bulgarian advance. The war diary of the commander of the German Army Group 'E', with its detailed day-by-day record of military actions in Kosovo, contains hardly any references to Partisan actions at all. The general pattern was that the towns in Western Kosovo were 'liberated', i.e. taken over by Partisan forces, only after the Germans and their auxiliaries had left; in Eastern Kosovo it was the Soviet and Bulgarian forces (with some Yugoslav Partisans attached to them) who took over, also after the Germans had got out." For more, see Noel Malcolm, Kosovo: A Short History, New York University Press, 1998, pp. 310-313, ISBN   0814755984.
  8. 1 2 3 4 Velojić, Dalibor (2018). Prodor jedinica 13. korpusa NOVJ na Kosovo 1944. godine i ugrožavanje odstupnice grupi armija "E". Baština: Institut za srpsku kulturu Priština-Leposavić. pp. 231–240.
  9. 1 2 "Kosovska Operacija".
  10. ↑ Tomasevich, Jozo (October 2002). War and Revolution in Yugoslavia: 1941 – 1945. Stanford University Press. p. 156. ISBN   9780804779241.
  11. ↑ Biddiscombe 2006, p. 175.
  12. ↑ Motadel 2014, p. 232.
  13. ↑ Fischer 1999, p. 227.
  14. ↑ Tomasevich, Jozo (October 2002). War and Revolution in Yugoslavia: 1941 – 1945. Stanford University Press. p. 156. ISBN   9780804779241.
  15. 1 2 3 4 P. Ramet, Sabrina (2006). The Three Yugoslavias: State-building and Legitimation, 1918–2005. Indiana University Press. p. 156. ISBN   0253346568.

Sources

This page is based on this Wikipedia article
Text is available under the CC BY-SA 4.0 license; additional terms may apply.
Images, videos and audio are available under their respective licenses.
批量镜像网站 开源整站镜像工具 镜像软件 镜像程序 网站离线镜像