The Horn of Africa conflict, also known as the Saudi-UAE feud, refers to several interconnected conflicts and regional alliances in the Horn of Africa, that developed in the early 2020s. The Horn of Africa region encompasses Sudan, South Sudan, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Djibouti, Somalia, and Kenya. Sudan, South Sudan, Ethiopia, and Somalia are all in active states of civil war. The primary regional alliances are the Turkish-Saudi alliance, which the Critical Threats Project dubs the "Status Quo Alliance", and the Emirati-dominated axis, which Critical Threats calls "Axis of Revisionism".[1][2]
While civil wars have been prevalent in the region throughout the 2020s, such as the 2020–2022 Tigray war in Ethiopia, the Sudanese civil war that began in 2023, the Somali Civil War which has been ongoing since 2009, the Yemeni civil war that began in 2014, and a medley of smaller insurgencies in South Sudan, Chad, Kenya, and the Central African Republic, a regional rivalry between Saudi-backed groups and Emirati-backed groups did not emerge publicly until December 2025.[3]
The start of the conflict between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates first showed itself in the 2025 Hadhramaut offensive, when the Emirati-backed Southern Transitional Council launched an offensive against it's former ally, the Saudi-backed Presidential Leadership Council, which serves as the Yemeni government. The STC captured large swathes of southern and eastern Yemen and declared independence on January 3. Four days later, all gains were reversed by a Yemeni government campaign and the STC was dissolved.[4]
Immediately after the offensive, public relations soured between Saudi Arabia and the UAE.[5][6] Saudi Arabia began publicly decrying war crimes by groups backed by the United Arab Emirates, like the Rapid Support Forces' attacks on civilians in Sudan.[7] Egypt, a longtime supporter of the Sudanese Armed Forces, said that it shared the "same views" on Sudan as Saudi Arabia and Yemen.[8] Saudi Arabia also began purchasing Pakistani jets for the SAF.[9] The Somali government cancelled all contracts with the UAE in early January.[10]
In late 2025, Israel recognized the long-unrecognized de facto independent state of Somaliland in exchange for an Israeli military base in the area. The UAE currently operates several military bases at Berbera in Somaliland and Bosaso in Puntland.[11] Bosaso and Berbera are both ports used by the UAE to supply Ethiopia and the Rapid Support Forces with weapons.[12] In February 2026, Reuters published an investigation confirming that the Ethiopian government was hosting RSF militants on Ethiopian territory and facilitating an RSF offensive into Blue Nile State.[13]
Analysts have warned that the growing interconnectedness of civil wars and conflicts in the region could lead to a World War I-style mass conflict that encompasses the region.[14][15][16]
Background
Arms deals of the 2010s and Saudi-Emirati alliance
Throughout the 2010s, both Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates began funding various governments and militias in civil wars across the Horn of Africa and Red Sea region. For the most part, these arms deals were limited.[17] The Saudi government funded only the Yemeni government and launched an intervention against the Houthis in 2015, and did not invest much into other foreign governments or militias in the Red Sea region.[18]
In the Yemeni civil war that broke out in 2014, both Saudi Arabia and the UAE were aligned in supporting the Yemeni Armed Forces and allied militias against the Shiite Houthis.[19] The United Arab Emirates invaded the Yemeni island of Socotra and supported the Southern Transitional Council, who at the time was allied with the Yemeni government against the Houthis. The STC joined the Yemeni government's Presidential Leadership Council in 2022, with support from both the Saudi and Emirati governments.[20] On smaller diplomatic matters in the Middle East, such as the Qatar diplomatic crisis in 2017, the Saudi and Emirati governments (among others) worked together to blockade Qatar over the country's alleged support of militant Salafist-Islamist groups.[21]
The Tigray war that began in 2020 between the Ethiopian government and the Tigray People's Liberation Front was a catalyst in reorganizing many of these regional alliances. The Eritrean government, a longtime enemy of Ethiopia until 2018 when President Abiy Ahmed reignited relations between the two countries, aided the Ethiopian government in its campaign and genocidal war against the Tigrayans.[30][31] The war was won in an Ethiopian offensive backed by Emirati drones, with the UAE supporting Ethiopia with arms since before the war began.[32][33][34] Turkey and Iran were also important sources of drones to Ethiopia.[33]
The war and it's aftermath led to an expanded partnership between the Ethiopian government and the UAE.[35] The UAE increased investment into Ethiopian civilian infrastructure and economic development, and supported Ethiopian irredentist rhetoric to gain a port.[35] The UAE also played a mediation role in the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam dispute between Ethiopia, Sudan, and Egypt.[36][37]
Following the Sudanese revolution in 2019, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt increased engagement with the Transitional Sovereignty Council that took power after Omar al-Bashir.[38] After failing to negotiate a power-sharing agreement with the Forces of Freedom and Change (FFC) in 2020, the three countries along with Sudan's neighbors Chad, South Sudan, Ethiopia, and Eritrea.[38] During the 2021 Sudanese coup d'état, these countries continued to back the TSC's authoritarian regime, with the UAE backing Rapid Support Forces commander Hemedti in particular, due to the RSF having been deployed to Yemen to fight the Houthis and the RSF being present in gold-mining areas to be shipped to Dubai.[38]
In late 2022, the UAE began co-opting elements of the pro-democratic civil society to support Hemedti and the RSF when debates began within the TSC over integrating the RSF into the Sudanese Army.[38][39] These tensions came to a head on April 15, 2023, when Hemedti and the Rapid Support Forces attempted to overthrow Abdelfattah al-Burhan, sparking a civil war and battles in every major Sudanese city.[40] Since the start of the war, the United Arab Emirates has funneled arms and formed an army of online bots to support the RSF on the ground and diplomatically.[41][42][43] Emirati supply lines were facilitated by Chad, with the UAE building hospitals for RSF troops in the Chadian city of Amdjarass.[44] Saudi Arabia and Egypt, Burhan's allies, provided less support. Saudi Arabia hosted negotiations between the two sides in Jeddah, leading to brief ceasefires but no end to the war. Egypt, until 2025, only intervened to save Egyptian troops under attack by the RSF at Meroë.[45]
Israeli and Somaliland normalization
In 2020, the UAE normalized relations with Israel in the United States-sponsored Abraham Accords. After the October 7 attacks and the subsequent Gaza genocide, many Arab countries froze or criticized Arab countries' engagement with Israel. The UAE found itself as one of the last few Arab nations with close ties to Israel.[46][47] Israel and the UAE continued the weapons trade with one another, and Israeli-made weapons were found in use by the Rapid Support Forces in Sudan.[48][49]
Israel also supported Emirati and Ethiopian ambitions for a port in the Red Sea. On January 1, 2024, Somaliland agreed to lease a 20km strip of land near Berbera for Ethiopian use for a port.[50] The UAE invested $442M into this port.[50] The Berbera port gained scrutiny in 2024 and 2025 for being the location that Emirati weapons deliveries to the RSF would ship through.[51][52]
In February 2025, the Rapid Support Forces announced the formation of a parallel government in Sudan called the Government of Peace and Unity, with its political wing known as Tasis.[53] The announcement ceremony of the parallel government was hosted in Nairobi, Kenya.[54] Members of the RSF, tribal elders associated with the RSF, members of Abdelaziz al-Hilu's Sudan People's Liberation Movement–North (SPLM-N al-Hilu) militia, and RSF political allies within the Forces of Freedom and Change and other political parties attended the ceremony.[55][56] Shortly after hosting the conference, Kenya received a $1.5 billion loan from the UAE and an increase in Emirati arms to the RSF through Kenya.[57] Later that year, Kenyan weapons were discovered in he armory of the Rapid Support Forces.[57]
Turkish rapprochement in Somalia
After the election of Hassan Sheikh Mohamud in 2022, Turkish special forces and drones were crucial in facilitating HSM's offensive against al-Shabaab in central Somalia in 2022.[58] Turkish influence in Somalia increased extensively after 2017, and Turkish troops filled in spots where African Union troops faltered.[59] Turkish investment in Somali government and private economic sectors have been dubbed by critics like Rashid Abdi as Turkey fully "owning" Somalia.[60] Prior to 2022, Emirati and Chinese fishing companies exploited fishing rights in Somali waters through extensive corruption.[61]
Emirati statecraft and rival aloofness
The United Arab Emirates has, for the most part, been the foremost actor in spearheading influence in the Horn of Africa through monetary incentives like loans, humanitarian aid, and military aid. In exchange, the UAE will receive exclusive deals regarding ports, military bases, and state-owned companies to exploit natural resources.[62][63] By December 2025, this had enabled the UAE to be a dominant background actor in conflicts across the Horn of Africa and a key regional player. Emirati involvement in war crimes by groups sponsored by the UAE are overlooked by Western governments.[64][65]
The UAE has also built a sprawling financial network that enables it's proxies and allied governments to circumvent sanctions while the UAE reaps resource benefits.[66][67][63] In areas where the UAE does not have control over the United Nations-recognized government - like Libya, Sudan, Yemen, and Somalia - they have supported what Middle East Eye dubbed an "axis of secessionists", aiding the Libyan National Army, Tasis, the Southern Transitional Council, and Somaliland respectively.[68]
Opponents of Emirati foreign policy remained mostly neutral up to December 2025. In the early days of the Sudanese civil war, Saudi Arabia and the UAE posited themselves as neutral mediators, with the former hosting multiple failed dialogues between the Sudanese Army and the RSF.[69]
Conflict
Southern Transitional Council offensive and Somalia
On December 1, 2025, the Emirati-backed Southern Transitional Council (STC) launched an offensive against it's former ally the Saudi-backed Presidential Leadership Council (PLC), capturing wide swathes of southern and eastern Yemen over the course of a month.[70] By the end of the year, the STC had seized almost all PLC-controlled territories with the exception of a few near the Saudi border.[70][71] On December 30, the Saudi Ministry of Foreign Affairs released a statement criticizing the UAE's support of the STC offensive.[72] This statement was the first public diplomatic break between the UAE and Saudi Arabia. The UAE rejected the accusations.[70] On January 3, the Southern Transitional Council declared independence; that same day, the Saudi government and PLC launched a counter-offensive that officially dissolved the STC by January 7.[71][4] During the fall, STC leader Aidarus al-Zoubaidi fled to the UAE through Somaliland.[73]
On December 26, amidst the STC offensive, Israel became the first UN-recognized country to recognize the de facto independent state of Somaliland.[74] The recognition came several months after talks between the Israeli government and Somaliland over Somaliland hosting expelled and resettled Palestinians from the Gaza genocide.[74] Somali President Mohamud rebuked the recognition, calling it Israeli interference.[75] In early January, the Saudi Foreign Ministry led other countries in releasing a statement condemning a bilateral Israeli-Somaliland visit.[76]^Israel also tacitly supported the STC's offensive.[77]
In early January, Somalia announced the inauguration of North East State in Las Anod, a city formerly under Somalilander control that Somali government-backed militias won in a war in 2023.[78] The ceremony was unusually attended by ambassadors from Saudi Arabia, Djibouti, Turkey, China, and Sudan.[78] Additionally, Turkey and Saudi Arabia signed a deal with Somalia to build a military base at Las Qoray, in North East State.[78] The announcement occurred days after Somalia cancelled all port management and security guarantees with the UAE, saying that the UAE "didn't engage us as an independent and sovereign nation."[79] The states of Jubaland, Somaliland, and Puntland - all with close ties to the UAE - invalidated the Somali government's statement.[80]
Sudan and Ethiopia
The Saudi-dominated coalition began increasing support to the Sudanese Armed Forces after the STC offensive and Israeli recognition of Somaliland. On January 15, Saudi Arabia funded a SAF purchase of Pakistani fighter jets - Saudi Arabia's first arms support to the SAF since the start of the war.[80] By January 2026, the SAF and RSF were in a clash for the Kordofan region in central-southern Sudan, months after an arms race.[81][82]
In northern Ethiopia, clashes broke out on January 29 between the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) and the Ethiopian government (ENDF) in Tselemti, Tigray Region.[83] The clashes between the TPLF and ENDF were the first since the end of the Tigray war in 2022, and many experts warned of a second war in the region.[83] While the clashes dissipated, they corresponded with major announcements by separatist groups in Ethiopia. Various ethnic Amhara Fano militias organized into the Amhara Fano National Movement against the ENDF in January 2026.[84] Fano, which aided the ENDF in its war against Tigray between 2020 and 2022, has since become allied with the TPLF against the Ethiopian government.[85] In February, three ethnic Somali organizations in Ethiopia formed the Somali People's Alliance for Self-Determination (SPASD). Despite saying it was solely a political alliance, SPASD included the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF), who fought a war against the Ethiopian government in the 1980s.[86]
The Ethiopian government has also intensified maximalist claims against Eritrea, it's former ally in the Tigray war. Ethiopian president Abiy Ahmed increased his calls for Ethiopian access to the sea, particularly lamenting the loss of the Eritrean port city of Assab.[87] Ethiopia accused Eritrea of carrying out massacres against civilians during the Eritrean occupation of Tigray in 2022 and 2023, massacres which the Ethiopian government denied for years.[88] In February 2026, Ethiopia accused Eritrea of launching incursions into Ethiopian territory.[89] Eritrea then began outwardly supporting the TPLF.[89]
On February 10, Reuters published an investigation confirming that an Emirati-funded military base was training Ethiopian recruits and hosting RSF militants in Benishangul-Gumuz Region.[90] The base was the main source of an RSF offensive on Sudan's Blue Nile state that began in February 2026, with the RSF capturing small parts of the state and advancing towards Kurmuk.[91] The investigation confirmed Ethiopian involvement in Sudan's civil war on the side of the RSF. The Sudanese Army also confirmed that it was training Somali soldiers in Galmudug since 2024 in a two-year long clandestine program.[92]
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